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Abstract—Software Defined Networking (SDN) has emerged as
a key enabler for future agile Internet architecture. Nevertheless,
the flexibility provided by SDN architecture manifests several
new design issues in terms of network security. These issues
must be addressed in a unified way to strengthen overall network
security for future SDN deployments. Consequently, in this paper,
we propose a Gated Recurrent Unit Recurrent Neural Network
(GRU-RNN) enabled intrusion detection systems for SDNs. The
proposed approach is tested using the NSL-KDD dataset, and
we achieve an accuracy of 89% with only six raw features.
Our experiment results also show that the proposed GRU-RNN
does not deteriorate the network performance. Through extensive
experiments, we conclude that the proposed approach exhibits a
strong potential for intrusion detection in the SDN environments.
Index Terms—software defined networking; SDN; intrusion de-
tection; deep learning; recurrent neural network; gated recurrent
unit; GRU; network security
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
The current Internet architecture has existed for nearly three
decades and is now becoming an increasingly complex system.
Consequently, the legacy Internet lacks agility to respond
to ever changing demands and dynamic nature of modern
day applications. Software Defined Networking (SDN) [1] is
introduced as a promising architecture, enabling scalability and
unprecedented flexibility in the configuration and deployment
of network services. The separation of control plane and
data plane provides more flexibility and greater control over
the traffic flows. The flow-based nature of SDNs enables
network information acquistion in real-time via the OpenFlow
[2] protocol. Nevertheless, as highlighted in [3], the SDN
architecture also introduces various security issues pertaining
to the control plane, the control-data interface and the control-
application interface. Recently, SDN security has become a
serious concern and has attracted significant interest (For
instance, see [4] and [5] and references there in).
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is one of the most im-
portant network security tools. The Anomaly-based IDS tries
to identify observations that deviates from a baseline model.
Various approaches have been proposed for the Anomaly-
based IDS like artificial neural network (ANN), support vec-
tor machine (SVM), and Bayesian Network. However, these
techniques have a high False Alarm Rate (FAR) and associ-
ated computational cost as mentioned in [6]. Recently, Deep
Learning (DL) has emerged as a new approach that delivers
higher accuracy than traditional machine learning techniques.
DL has the ability to process raw data and learn the high-
level features on its own, and so DL has a strong case for its
adaptability in resource constrained networks like SDNs.
B. Contribution
Following the current trajectory of research, we believe that
deep recurrent neural networks (RNNs) can potentially offer
better solution for implemention of IDS for SDN. A Gated
Recurrent Unit Recurrent Neural Network (GRU-RNN) is
proposed for anomaly detection. The GRU-RNN is a powerful
technique that can represent the relationship between current
and previous events and enhance the anomaly detection rate.
In summary, the major contributions of this paper are the
following:
• We introduce an IDS in the SDN paradigm using GRU-
RNN. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
attempt to use GRU-RNN for an IDS in the SDN en-
vironment.
• Our GRU-RNN approach yields a detection rate of 89%
using a minimum number of features compared to other
state-of-the-art approaches.
• We also evaluate the network performance of the pro-
posed approach in the SDN. The test results show that our
approach is significantly potential for real time detection.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
shows the related work. In Section III, we present the system
description. Section IV presents the detection performance
analysis. The network performance analysis is described in
Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and presents
future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In past several studies (see [7], [8], [9] and [10]), researchers
have employed classical machine learning mechanism such as
SVM, K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN), ANN, Random Forest
etc. for developing an IDS. These proposed methods have
achieved various degrees of success while rendering some
inherent limitations. These work focus on tradintional network
with a large set of features that cannot be applied to SDNs.
Early work on the flow-based anomaly detection approach
using SDN include [11] and [12]. Braga et al. [11] present
a lightweight approach using a Self Organizing Map (SOM)
to detect DDoS attacks in the SDN. This approach based on
six traffic flow features gives quite high detection accuracy. In
[12], the author use four traffic anomaly detection algorithms
(threshold random walk with credit based rate limiting, rate
limiting, maximum entropy and NETAD) in the SDN. The
experiments indicate that these algorithms perform better in
the SOHO (Small Office/Home Office) network than in the
ISP (Internet Service Provider).
In [13] and [14], SVM is used to detect DDoS attacks
quite efficiently. K-Nearest Neighbor and graph theory are
combined to classify DDoS attacks from benign flows in SDNs
by AlEroud et al. in [15]. Mousavi et al. [16] propose an early
DDoS attack detection method against the SDN controller
based on the variation of the entropy of the flow’s destination
IP addresses. Their detection rate is 96% with just first 250
packets. In [17], the authors propose a DL based approach
using a stacked autoencoder (SAE) for detecting DDoS attacks
in the SDN. They achieve a quite high accuracy and low FAR
on their own dataset.
In 2016, we applied Deep Neural Network (DNN) under
the context of SDNs with the NSL-KDD dataset [18]. We
obtained a potential accuracy of 75.75% with just six basic
features. In this paper, we continue this trend by using GRU-
RNN to improve the detection accuracy and reduce the FAR.
III. METHODOLOGY/SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, the RNN and GRUs are briefly reviewed.
The architecture of the SDN-based IDS is described in detail.
The NSL-KDD dataset are also discussed in this section.
A. Recurrent Neural Networks
A RNN, which is an extension of a conventional feed for-
ward neural network, makes use of the sequential information.
The RNNs are called recurrent because they perform the same
task for every element of a sequence, with the output being
depended on the previous computations.
The hidden states of the RNN are computed as:
ht = σ(Wxt + Uht−1 + bh), for t = T, . . . , 1, (1)
where σ is a nonlinearity function, xt is an input vector at
time t, ht is a hidden state vector at time t, W is an input to
hidden weight matrix, U is a hidden to hidden weight matrix,
and bh is a bias term.
The Backpropagation Through Time (BPTT) algorithm is
used for training the RNN. However, the traditional RNN
encounters vanishing/exploding gradient problems [19]. Long
Short Term Memory (LSTM) [20] networks and Gated Recur-
rent Units (GRUs) [21] were proposed to solve this problem.
B. Gated Recurrent Unit
GRUs are selected in our research because of their sim-
plicity and faster training phase compared to LSTMs [22].
Fig. 1 shows architectural detail of a single GRU cell. The
relationship in Fig. 1 is given by
rt = σ(xtWr + ht−1Ur), (2)
Fig. 1. Gated Recurrent Unit Structure [22]
zt = σ(xtWz + ht−1Uz), (3)
ht = (1− zt)ht−1 + zth˜t, (4)
h˜t = tanh(xtWh + (ht−1 ⊙ rt)Uh), (5)
where rt is the reset gate, zt is the update gate, ht is the
activation function and h˜t is the candidate activation. ⊙ is
an element-wise multiplication, and σ is the logistic sigmoid
function. W∗ and U∗ are denoted as learned weight matrices.
C. System Architecture
The IDS is implemented as an application on the SDN
controller. This paper focuses on the use of SDN paradigm
as a network infrastructure for the IDS. The SDN-based IDS
architecture is described in Fig. 2 with three main components:
Flow Collector, Anomaly Detector and Anomaly Mitigator.
• Flow Collector: This module is triggered by a packet-
in message or a timer function to aggregate all the flow
statistics such as protocol, source and destination IP and
source and destination port. All the aggregated features
will be sent to the Anomaly Detector module.
• Anomaly Detector: We choose the GRU-DNN as the
core of the Anomaly Detector module in this paper.
This module loads a trained model, receives the network
statistics and decides if a flow is an anomaly or not.
• Anomaly Mitigator: Through the Anomaly Detector’s
results, the Anomaly Mitigator module can make deci-
sions on the flow (e.g., drop or forward the flow).
Fig. 2. SDN-based IDS Architecture
D. Dataset
The NSL-KDD dataset [23] is one of the state-of-the-art
datasets for IDS evaluation. This dataset has 41 features which
are categorised into three types of features: basic, content-
based and traffic-based features. Our IDS is trained by the
KDDTrain+ dataset and tested by the KDDTest+ dataset. In
addition, the KDDTest+ dataset contains 17 different types of
attacks in addition to 22 attack types out of the KDDTrain+
dataset. Thus, the KDDTest+ dataset is a reliable indicator to
the performance of the model on zero-day attacks as well.
Within the context of SDN, the packet content is not
directly accessible in the current OpenFlow protocol. So we
just focus on the basic and traffic-based features of the NSL-
KDD dataset. In our research, a mixed feature set with
six features is selected from these two feature set. These
features are selected based on their SDN related nature with-
out any feature selection algorithms. The selected features
are <duration, protocol_type, src_bytes, dst_bytes, srv_count,
dst_host_same_src_port_rate>. Details of these features can
be seen in [23].
The NSL-KDD dataset contains both the numerical and
symbolic features, consequently all the symbolic features
are transformed into numerical values. After converting, the
dataset is normalized into the range of [0-1] by Min-Max
scaling. Its mathematical equation is given as:
x
′
=
x−min(x)
max(x)−min(x)
, (6)
where x
′
is normalized value, x is original value.
IV. DETECTION PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we firstly explain all the detection evalua-
tion metrics. Secondly, we describe all the experiment setup.
Finally, the results are given and compared with other works
for a better overview.
A. Evaluation Metrics
For evaluation purpose, Precision (P), Recall (R), F-measure
(F) and accuracy (ACC) metrics are used. These metrics are
calculated by using four different measures, true positive (TP),
true negative (TN), false positive (FP) and false negative (FN):
• TP: the number of anomaly records correctly classified.
• TN: the number of normal records correctly classified.
• FP: the number of normal records incorrectly classified.
• FN: the number of anomaly record incorrectly classified.
Accuracy (AC): the percentage of true detection over total
traffic records,
AC =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
. (7)
Precision (P): the percentage of predicted anomalous in-
stances predicted are actual anomalous instances,
P =
TP
TP + FP
. (8)
Recall (R): the percentage of predicted anomalous instances
versus all the anomalous instances presented,
R =
TP
TP + FN
. (9)
F-measure (F): the harmonic of the precision and recall
metrics to express the performance of the model,
F =
2
1
P
+ 1
R
. (10)
B. Experimental Setup
In our experiments, we use Keras [24] to implement our
GRU-RNN, DNN, and VanilaRNN models. We use a Nadam
optimizer [25] and a mean squared error (MSE) for the model.
In addition, we added L_1-regularization to prevent over fitting
during the training phase. The hyper-parameter configuration
is 25, 10000 and 0.001 for the batch size, the epoch and the
learning rate respectively. Scikit-learn library [26] is used to
implement the SVM algorithm and measure all the evaluation
metrics. The detail of our models can be seen in Table I.
TABLE I
NEURAL NETWORK MODEL STRUCTURE
Algorithm Input Layer Hidden Layer Output Layer
GRU-RNN 6 6,4,2 1
DNN 6 6,4,2 1
VanilaRNN 6 4 1
C. Experimental Results
To start with, we present the detection performance of the
GRU-RNN in terms of P, R, F and AC. We also compare
the performance of the GRU-RNN with other algorithms like
VanilaRNN, SVM and DNN using the same mixed feature set.
Table II shows that the proposed GRU-RNN outperforms in all
the evaluation metrics for all classes. The detection rate of the
legitimate and anomaly traces is 89% and 90% respectively.
The results also show that the GRU-RNN is good at detecting
zero-day attacks with the anomaly detection AC of 90%. The
GRU-RNN yields good results for all classes, while other
algorithms just work well in only one class.
TABLE II
THE DETECTION PERFORMANE COMPARISON
Algorithm
Legitimate Class Anomaly Class
P (%) R (%) F (%) P (%) R (%) F (%)
VanilaRNN 43 90 58 57 10 17
SVM 71 32 44 64 90 75
DNN 67 89 76 88 66 76
GRU-DNN 87 89 88 91 90 90
As seen in Table III, our approach outperforms other ap-
proaches dealing with low-dimension and raw features. The
DNN, coming in second place, shows the potential of the
DL approach in anomaly detection. The VanilaRNN gives the
worst result compared with its counterpart GRU-RNN.
TABLE III
ACCURACY COMPARISON WITH OTHER ALGORITHMS
Algorithm Accuracy
VanilaRNN 44.39%
SVM 65.67%
DNN 75.9%
GRU-RNN (Proposed Model) 89%
In the following, the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve is presented as a standard measure for classifier
comparison. The ROC curve is created by plotting the False
Positive Rate (FPR) versus the True Positive Rate (TPR).
The area under the curve (AUC) is used to determine which
classifier predicts the classes best. The higher the AUC, then
the better is the classifier. Fig. 3 shows that the proposed
GRU-RNN achieves the highest AUC amongst all the tested
algorithms as expected. The TPR of the GRU-DNN is about
90% and the FPR is about 10%. It has higher TPR and lower
FPR compared to other algorithms. As we can see, the GRU-
RNN helps reduce the FP which is an important factor of the
IDS. The VanilaRNN gives the worst performance as expected.
Fig. 3. ROC Curve Comparison for Different Algorithms
Furthermore, we also compare the performance of the
proposed model with others in the literature. Our GRU-RNN
is compared with SVM, DNN and NB Tree algorithms. Table
IV contains the anomaly detection AC of the state-of-the-art
results against our proposed model. The results show that our
model outperforms all the previous methods. Our GRU-RNN
performs better than the SVM and NB Tree algorithms that
use a set of 41 features for training and testing. The GRU-
RNN result also indicates a significant improvement in AC
compared to the basic DNN in our previous work.
TABLE IV
ACCURACY COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS STUDIES
Method Accuracy
SVM [23] 69.52%
DNN [18] 75.75 %
NB Tree [23] 82.02%
GRU-RNN (Proposed Model) 89%
V. NETWORK PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the effect of the GRU-RNN on
the network performance. The evaluation testbed is described
in the first part and then the network performance evaluation
is presented.
A. Experimental Setup
The GRU-RNN is implemented as an application written
in Python language in a POX [27] controller. Cbench [28] is
a standard tool used for evaluating the SDN controller per-
formance. Cbench runs in two modes: throughput and latency
modes. In the throughput mode, it computes the maximum
number of packets handled by the controller. In the latency
mode, it computes the time needed to process a single flow
by the controller.
We run our experiments on a virtual machine having an
Intel Core i5-4460 3.2GHz with 3 cores available and 8GB of
RAM. The operating system is Ubuntu 14.04 LTS-64bit.
The controller performance is tested with a different number
of virtual OpenFlow switches emulated by Cbench. The per-
formance of the stand-alone POX controller is considered as a
baseline for our evaluation. We also compare the GRU-RNN
with the DNN in our previous work [18].
B. Analysis of Results
Fig. 4 depicts the average response rate of the controller
under three testing scenarios. As we can see, both the DNN
and GRU-RNN cause the overhead on the controller. The
DNN algorithm is simpler than the GRU-RNN, and so it
gives a slightly better performance than that of the GRU-
RNN. However, the GRU-RNN outperforms the DNN in terms
of the detection accuracy. The affect of the GRU-RNN on
the controller is predictable and unavoidable. The throughput
decreases slightly when the network size increases from 32
to 64 switches. The network performance degrades by about
3.5% when the network size is under 32 switches. When we
increase the size to over 64 switches, the throughput drops by
about 4%.
Fig. 4. Throughput Evaluation
As we can see in Fig. 5, the latency increases along with
increasing the network size. When we increase the network
size, the load on the controller is increased as well and causes
the overhead. The GRU-RNN still has the highest overhead
amongst all.The overall degradation is about 7% in all cases.
Fig. 5. Latency Evaluation
All in all, the overhead caused by the GRU-RNN on the
POX controller is quite low, and so our proposed approach
has significant potential for real-time anomaly detection in
the SDN environments. From a network perspective this is
a compromise between performance and security which all
network administrators have to deal with.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present an Anomaly-based IDS in the SDN
environment using the GRU-RNN algorithm. We show that the
GRU-RNN outperforms other state-of-the-art algorithms with
an accuracy of 89%. Our scheme uses a minimum number of
features compared to other state-of-the-art approaches. This
makes the model more computationally efficient for real time
detection. In addition, the network performance evaluation
showed that our proposed approach does not significant af-
fect the controller performance. Therefore, it is practical for
implementation under the context of SDN.
In the future, we will optimize our model and use other
features to increase the accuracy. We will also try to implement
our approach in a distributed manner to reduce the overhead
on the controller.
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